“THE time of victory has come…today I declare the start of these victorious operations to free you from the violence and terrorism of Daesh [Islamic State].” With these words, broadcast at 2am on October 17th, Iraq’s prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, announced the start of the long-awaited offensive to liberate Mosul, the country’s second-biggest city, which was seized by IS in June 2014, and is the only significant place in Iraq that the jihadists still hold. Mr Abadi added: “The Iraqi flag will be raised in the middle of Mosul and in each village and corner very soon.” Across the rest of Iraq, following a series of victories this year, it already has been.
This last battle will be the hardest though. In what will be the most complex military operation in Iraq since the American invasion in 2003, the opening phase of a battle that may take many weeks to conclude began with some 4,000 Kurdish Peshmerga forces advancing on three fronts from the east to within about eight miles (13km) of the city. Supported by attack helicopters and air strikes by the American-led coalition, their initial aim is to take control of a number of IS-held villages covering a 45 square mile (115 sq km) area across the Nineveh plain. Iraqi forces pushing up from the south should soon join them.
It is too early to say how stiff will be the resistance they face. IS has had many months to prepare its positions, and the precise date of the offensive’s beginning had been heavily trailed, denying any possibility of tactical surprise.
Michael Knights of the Washington Institute, an American think-tank, who has spent time with the Iraqi security forces (ISF) during their preparations for the assault, says that the push should be seen as the gradual unfolding of a multi-phased operation, which began with the refurbishment of the Qayyarah airbase, some 40 miles south of Mosul, after it was recaptured by the ISF in early July. Qayyarah, which can now handle cargo aircraft, is both the logistical base and the collecting point for Iraqi army forces gathering for the attack. About 600 American military advisers (and special forces) also arrived there a couple of weeks ago to train and prepare Iraqi forces.
In all, there appear to be around 25,000 Iraqi army and special forces troops committed to the battle (though other estimates are barely half that), who, says Mr Knights, have been drawn from across the country to form multi-ethnic, cross-sectarian units. Another 6,000 or so mainly Sunni tribal and paramilitary forces have been recruited from the surrounding area. As well as the Kurdish peshmerga, mainly Iranian-backed Shia popular mobilisation forces (known as Hashd al-Shaabi) are also keen to get in on the action. However, the aim is for them to secure areas to the south and west of Mosul, but not to join in the fighting for the city. Their entry there would not be welcome by its mainly Sunni Arab inhabitants, who know only too well of their reputation for carrying out reprisals against “collaborators”.
The plan for retaking Mosul has been adapted from what is now quite a well-honed playbook. In particular, the liberation of Fallujah, which took less than four weeks in June, provides a template. The opening phase of the battle is essentially an ever-tightening encirclement operation intended to cut off the IS fighters inside the city (variously estimated to number from 2,000 to 8,000) from reinforcements or supplies and to cut off their escape routes west into Syria. The second phase will see Iraqi forces making contact with the enemy at an increasing number of points around the edges of the city. The aim will be to make IS respond to artillery and missile attacks. Once IS fighters show their positions, say American military advisers, they can be quickly and accurately picked off from the air. The third phase of the operation will be led by Iraq’s elite counter-terrorism units, who will enter the city at different points after coalition air power has pounded IS positions. If successful, the final stabilisation phase will see the introduction of other Iraqi forces, including police, to hold ground, help mop up whatever pockets of resistance remain and begin the task of restoring governance to the traumatised inhabitants. That could happen by late November or it may be delayed until well into December.
How smoothly or otherwise things go will depend in large part on whether IS sees the need to go down fighting for propaganda purposes or whether it accepts the inevitable and makes a tactical retreat to Syria, perhaps to conserve its strength for a last stand there. It may well decide on the former if only because the latter may not be possible. When fleeing IS convoys left Fallujah, they represented an easy target for circling coalition aircraft. Some have argued for an escape corridor to be deliberately left open, to minimise civilian deaths. That seems unlikely. According to IHS Janes, a consultancy, most of the IS forces in Mosul are locals who have been conscripted. Discipline is maintained by a relatively small number of ideologically committed foreign fighters who may struggle to prevent defections. IS may also encounter resistance from within the city as the fighting develops. The so-called Mosul Brigades, an anti-IS movement in the city, have only offered symbolic defiance up to now but as the fighting develops they can provide vital targeting intelligence.
Another major problem for IS is the sheer size of the urban area covered by Mosul, whose perimeter extends for about 30 miles. And while the jihadists have had plenty of time to build defences, dig tunnels and prepare booby traps, the same is also true of the surveillance operation. Drones have been flying over Mosul constantly for months, building a complete picture of everything that IS is doing and where, and who its local leaders are.
Given the impossibility of defending such a wide area, Mr Knights expects IS fighters to fall back on a couple of places where they can sell themselves most dearly. One is likely to be the government centre in the west of Mosul; the other is almost certain to be the narrow streets of the old city where superior firepower is least effective and the danger to civilians is highest.
That Mosul will in due course be back in the hands of the Iraqi government is not in doubt. But there remain many uncertainties. The most immediate is the fate of the 1m or more civilians who are still believed to be living in the city. As IS control begins to slip, thousands may try to escape. Although preparations for a big exodus have supposedly been made, confidence in their adequacy is not high.
In the slightly longer term, once the relief of seeing the back of IS has worn off, much will depend on the confidence that Mosul’s citizens have in Baghdad’s willingness and ability to secure and rebuild their city. That also is not high. The devolution of power from Baghdad, and the political voice that Sunnis will have within Iraq, will be important, too. Lastly, while the pretensions of IS to hold and administer territory in Iraq may have been shattered, its capacity to wage a continuing brutal insurgency should not be underestimated. The fear is that while the liberation of Mosul marks the end of one horror, it may herald the beginning of something almost as bad.
Comments