Economy

The Economic Costs of Israel’s Wars

"To assess Israel’s economic performance over the past three years, we must therefore look beyond stock prices, the shekel, and the labor market, and examine output, investment, and actual employment.

 

By Joseph Zeira

JERUSALEM — The results of Israel’s elections make it almost certain that political negotiations will continue for weeks. Equally clear is that whichever government ultimately takes office will have to begin addressing the mounting costs of Israel’s ongoing wars.

Although Israel has been at war since October 2023, many observers argue that its economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience, pointing to a booming stock market and a strong shekel as evidence. But is that really the case?

The answer depends on how we measure the economic costs of war. The direct budgetary costs are measured primarily by increases in defense spending. But there are also indirect costs, reflected in the impact on the business cycle, and the historical precedents are clear: since the First Intifada in 1987, every major escalation in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has led to an economic recession.

Israel’s defense spending has increased from approximately 4.2% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2022 to 7.8%, adding more than $1,600 per capita in annual costs. The government has financed this increase through borrowing. Since the introduction of the Economic Stabilization Program in 1985, Israel’s budget deficit had remained relatively low, averaging 3% of GDP, which kept government debt at around 60% of GDP. But the deficit rose from 1.8% of GDP in 2022 to 7.1% in 2023 and 9% in 2024, before declining to 6.5% in 2025.

Consequently, the cumulative increase in the deficit above its long-term average amounted to approximately 13% of GDP, far exceeding the rise in defense spending. This likely reflects other war-related expenditures, including the evacuation of large numbers of residents from border areas, which was also financed through deficit spending.

Debt financing shifts the financial burden of war onto future generations while substantially increasing that burden through higher interest payments. This was the case in the 1970s, when the War of Attrition (1968–1970) and the 1973 war pushed Israel’s fiscal deficit to 15% of GDP.

Until 1980, Israel had experienced only two economic recessions, thanks to rapid economic growth during the state’s early years and wars against the conventional armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Sustained growth required substantial investment, which stimulated aggregate demand, as did increased military spending.

These conventional wars came to an end following Israel’s 1979 peace treaty with Egypt, after which the other Arab states were no longer capable of forming a military coalition able to confront Israel. Defense spending subsequently declined from approximately 20% of GDP in 1980 to around 5% during the decade preceding October 2023.

As military spending declined, the Israeli economy became more vulnerable to recession. The First Intifada was followed by the recession of 1989, which ended as a result of increased demand following the arrival of nearly one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union beginning in 1990. The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 and the subsequent resumption of hostilities with the Palestinians led to another recession between 1997 and 1999. A third recession, lasting from 2001 to 2004, was triggered by the Second Intifada, which erupted in September 2000.

Indeed, these episodes of violence are more likely to trigger economic recessions because they generally lack a clear endpoint, increasing uncertainty and thereby discouraging investment. Unlike wars fought beyond Israel’s borders, conflicts with the Palestinians directly affect Israelis’ daily lives: people visit shopping malls less frequently, postpone purchases of durable goods, and tourism suffers.

The Gaza war appears to be no exception. In the fourth quarter of 2023, Israel’s GDP contracted by approximately 5.4%. It took more than a year for output to return to its previous level, and it remained below its long-term trend through at least the second quarter of 2026. Business-sector output fell by 9.9% in the fourth quarter of 2023 and remains below its trend. Investment also declined by 25% after October 2023 and has yet to recover to its prewar level.

Meanwhile, Israel’s unemployment rate has increased only slightly since October 2023. This can be explained by the extensive mobilization of approximately 200,000 military reservists—equivalent to 5% of the labor force—since the beginning of the war. Because reservists’ pay is covered by the National Insurance Institute, employers have been able to avoid laying off workers despite declining demand.

One might expect heightened wartime risks to depress stock prices. However, reduced investment also diminishes the economy’s capital stock, thereby increasing returns on capital. These higher returns compensate investors for assuming greater risks, helping explain why share prices have remained relatively stable over the past three years.

Consider the long-term effects of the Arab–Israeli conflict on capital intensity. For more than 50 years, the average capital-to-output ratio in Israel’s business sector has remained at 1, compared with approximately 1.6 in the United States. As I explained in my 2021 book, this gap can be attributed to higher levels of risk. The gross return on capital in Israel is approximately 33%, compared with just 21% in the United States. Thus, rising Israeli stock prices do not necessarily indicate a strong economy; they may instead reflect capital scarcity, which drives profits higher.

To understand why the shekel has remained so strong, we must turn to another consequence of the war: increased U.S. assistance to Israel. Before the war, annual American aid amounted to approximately $4 billion, equivalent to less than 1% of Israel’s GDP. The Bank of Israel sought to prevent the shekel from appreciating by maintaining foreign-exchange reserves equivalent to approximately 30% of GDP. Maintaining this ratio while the economy grows at an average annual rate of 3% requires annual dollar purchases roughly equivalent to the amount the United States transfers to Israel each year in military assistance.

But the war has brought a sharp increase in American support. During his presidency, former President Joe Biden approved $20 billion in arms sales to Israel. President Donald Trump has also expanded U.S. support. This more than doubles the inflow of dollars into Israel, contributing to an appreciation of the shekel.

To assess Israel’s economic performance over the past three years, we must therefore look beyond stock prices, the shekel, and the labor market, and examine output, investment, and actual employment. Those indicators reveal an economy experiencing prolonged stagnation, as has consistently been the case when the Israeli–Palestinian conflict intensifies.

 

Joseph Zeira is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the author of The Israeli Economy: A Story of Success and Costs (Princeton University Press, 2021).

Source: Project Syndicate — www.project-syndicate.org

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