Politics

Iraqi Kurdistan: Dividing an Already Divided Region Dashes Dreams of Independence

Protecting the region's unity requires more than calls to overcome differences; it requires rules that make disagreements manageable, preserve shared institutions, and effectively protect the interests of all its citizens.

The political crisis in Iraq's Kurdistan Region is approaching a turning point that places the unity of its administration under renewed strain. Nearly two years after parliamentary elections failed to produce a new government, the regional parliament reconvened on November 4, 2026. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) subsequently announced its withdrawal from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), threatening to establish a parallel administration if the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) proceeded with forming a government on the strength of its parliamentary lead. The dispute has thus moved beyond stalled negotiations over government positions to a confrontation affecting the legitimacy of the institutions intended to represent the entire region.

Yet discussion of a divided Kurdistan does not mean that separation has become inevitable or that the establishment of two separate administrations is imminent. The current crisis is unfolding in stages: paralysis in government formation, competition over parliamentary legitimacy, withdrawal from the administration, and threats to establish alternative institutions. A distinction remains between political threats and institutional fragmentation, but that distance narrows whenever disagreements produce decisions, administrative bodies, and resources that no longer recognize a common authority.

The significance of the crisis lies in the fact that competition between the KDP and PUK is not simply a dispute over ministerial portfolios. It is a struggle over the very definition of political partnership, the limits of party authority within regional institutions, and which side has the right to speak on the region's behalf before Baghdad and foreign governments. Unless the two parties agree on acceptable rules of governance, shared institutions could become little more than a façade concealing parallel centers of influence, weakening the autonomy the region has built over decades.

A Partnership That Ended the War but Failed to Unify the Centers of Power

The current crisis cannot be understood without revisiting the Kurdish civil war of the 1990s, when the KDP and PUK engaged in armed conflict over influence, revenues, and territorial control. The war ended through a U.S.-brokered political settlement, but it left behind a divided geographical and administrative landscape: KDP influence in Erbil and Duhok, and PUK influence in Sulaymaniyah and other areas. At that stage, regional unity did not amount to a fully unified authority, as each party retained its own institutions, administrative networks, and security apparatus.

The 2006 agreement sought to rebuild a joint regional government and distribute key positions between the two parties under the declared principles of partnership and consensus. The agreement helped consolidate stability and formally end the existence of dual administrations, but it did not automatically eliminate either party's influence over state institutions or the territories under its control. Academic studies examining Peshmerga reform and institution-building have shown that power-sharing arrangements brought two political forces together within a single government without fully ending divided loyalties or partisan control over certain security and administrative institutions.

The 2006 framework therefore contained elements of both strength and vulnerability. It gave the two parties an incentive to avoid returning to confrontation and established a foundation for broader political cooperation. However, the continuation of joint governance depended more heavily on understandings between party leaders than on institutional rules capable of resolving disputes when they arose.

When consensus prevailed, differences could be managed through bargaining. As trust deteriorated, however, previously deferred questions resurfaced: Should government positions be distributed according to election results or the partnership agreement? Who has the authority to convene a parliamentary session? And how can regional institutions enforce their decisions in areas effectively controlled by competing political parties?

A recent study by Chatham House describes the current crisis as more profound than a temporary disagreement over the number of ministries allocated to each party. It argues that the two sides no longer share the same understanding of how the region should be governed and that the formal and informal arrangements linking them over the past two decades have become less effective.

The study also notes that the parties' respective spheres of influence continue to shape the functioning of institutions and security agencies, even though the region is no longer formally divided into two administrations as it was in an earlier period.

This historical background makes the present dispute a test of the governing structure established after the civil war, rather than merely another unsuccessful round of political negotiations.

Election Results and the Absence of Agreed Power-Sharing Rules

The October 2024 elections gave the KDP 39 seats, compared with 23 for the PUK and 15 for the New Generation Movement. The KDP consequently emerged as the largest parliamentary bloc but failed to secure a majority sufficient to form a government on its own. The results announced by the electoral commission and reported by Reuters confirmed that no party had received a mandate strong enough to eliminate the need for understandings with other political forces.

The KDP argues that the distribution of ministries and senior positions should reflect each bloc's electoral strength. From this perspective, equal power-sharing between the two parties regardless of election results could diminish the value of voters' choices and perpetuate an arrangement that no longer reflects the political balance.

The PUK, meanwhile, invokes the 2006 agreement and the principle of partnership between the two parties to demand a balanced distribution of positions. It maintains that the region cannot be governed effectively by excluding a major political force with a substantial political and geographical support base.

These positions cannot be reduced to a simple confrontation between electoral legitimacy and partisan interests. Election results matter, but they did not produce a governing majority. Partnership agreements also matter, but they were negotiated under earlier political circumstances and cannot automatically be assumed to remain unchanged regardless of shifts in the balance of power.

The central problem is the absence of an agreed negotiating framework capable of reconciling these considerations. How should parliamentary seats translate into representation in government? What safeguards would prevent the largest party from turning its numerical advantage into unilateral rule? And what limits should apply to partnership demands when election results alter the distribution of political influence?

The absence of such rules has allowed the previous government to continue administering the region despite the election of a new parliament. According to media coverage, no new cabinet was formed following the elections, and Prime Minister Masrour Barzani continued leading a government established in 2019, while the legitimacy of its continued tenure and the scope of its powers remained subjects of legal and political dispute.

The disagreement is therefore no longer confined to which party receives a particular ministry or senior position. It now concerns how long a caretaker government can remain in office and whether it has the authority to make decisions extending beyond the administration of routine affairs.

Parliament Between Resuming Its Work and Entrenching Political Dominance

On November 4, 2026, the Kurdistan Region's parliament convened for the first time after a prolonged period of inactivity. The KDP secured the required quorum with the participation of lawmakers from other political forces and three PUK members.

According to local reports, lawmakers elected a new parliamentary leadership with 52 votes, while the PUK and the New Generation Movement boycotted the session and challenged both its legitimacy and the procedures used to convene it.

The KDP maintains that restoring parliamentary activity is essential to ending the political paralysis and that institutions cannot remain indefinitely suspended because the parties have failed to agree on a new government.

The PUK, by contrast, argues that the session was organized unilaterally while negotiations were still underway and that relying on lawmakers who broke ranks with their parliamentary blocs to secure a quorum violated the political understanding between the parties.

PUK officials also accused the KDP of offering money to buy lawmakers' votes. The KDP denied these allegations, while participating lawmakers were reported to have denied receiving financial benefits. These competing claims must therefore be treated as disputed allegations rather than judicially established facts.

The controversy raises a fundamental question about the difference between procedural parliamentary validity and political acceptance. A session may meet quorum requirements under the applicable rules without automatically resolving the crisis of trust among the parties expected to form a government.

Conversely, consensus cannot become a requirement that allows any parliamentary bloc to obstruct the legislature indefinitely. The challenge is to establish an arrangement that enables parliament to perform its functions while ensuring that numerical superiority is not used to impose arrangements excluding a major political force from executive authority.

On November 15, the Federal Supreme Court rejected an interim request to suspend parliamentary proceedings, according to Iraqi and Kurdish media reports. Other cases concerning the legitimacy of parliamentary procedures or the powers of the regional government remained under consideration.

The court also scheduled December 14 to hear a lawsuit seeking to restrict the powers of the incumbent government on the grounds that it was operating in a caretaker capacity, according to reports available through November 17.

These decisions concern specific legal proceedings and do not, by themselves, settle the underlying political crisis. Determining whether a parliamentary procedure is legally valid is different from reaching an agreement on a new government and sustainable rules of partnership.

Withdrawal and the Threat of a Parallel Administration

The PUK's announcement that it was withdrawing from the regional government following the parliamentary session transformed the dispute from a disagreement over procedures into a crisis affecting the principle of political participation.

PUK leader Bafel Talabani declared that his party would not recognize a parliament, government, or appointments resulting from what it regarded as a unilateral process. He threatened to establish a parallel government if the KDP proceeded to appoint a regional president and ministers without an agreement.

The KDP, for its part, announced that it wanted to prevent such a scenario and called on the PUK to return to dialogue.

Initially, withdrawal may serve as a bargaining instrument. Political parties frequently threaten to leave governments to reopen negotiations or increase the cost of ignoring their demands.

Repeated threats and refusals to recognize institutions elected or established by the opposing party, however, gradually change the nature of the crisis. When a party declares that it does not recognize a president or minister and then moves to appoint alternative officials, the situation begins to resemble the creation of a second executive authority, even without a formal announcement restoring the two-administration system.

Assessing how close the region is to fragmentation requires examining institutional actions rather than the intensity of political rhetoric alone.

Key indicators include the establishment of a parallel government with its own ministries and decisions; the issuance of conflicting orders in the region's name; separate arrangements for salaries, revenues, and budgets; declining coordination between governorates; and security agencies operating under independent partisan chains of command.

If these developments do not occur, the threat remains part of a serious but potentially containable political crisis. If institutions and resources begin operating under two separate authorities, however, fragmentation on the ground could precede any formal political declaration.

Comparisons with the 1990s help illustrate the scale of the risks, but they should not lead to an automatic prediction of renewed war or separation.

The region now possesses legal and parliamentary institutions, financial relationships with Baghdad, and broader economic networks. Both parties also face domestic and external pressures that make the costs of division substantial.

Nevertheless, distinct partisan spheres of influence and security and administrative institutions that have not been fully integrated under a unified command provide the foundations for functional fragmentation if political agreement remains elusive for an extended period.

Chatham House considers this geographical division to exist to varying degrees, although it has not yet developed into a complete return to two separate administrations.

Baghdad and the Judiciary: Between Resolving the Dispute and Expanding Federal Influence

With negotiations deadlocked in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, both parties have turned to Baghdad in search of political and financial support.

KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani met Iraq's prime minister and subsequently announced that regional salaries would continue to be paid through his government. Bafel Talabani also visited Baghdad and met Iraqi political forces and leaders.

These moves reflect an understanding that salary payments and the region's financial relationship with the federal government can influence the balance of negotiations within Kurdistan.

Baghdad could help ease financial pressures or bring the parties' positions closer together. Its involvement in partisan competition, however, carries a different risk: the relationship between the federal government and the region could become a means of favoring one party over the other, or each party could use its federal connections to compensate for setbacks in internal negotiations.

Under such circumstances, the crisis would no longer remain confined to Kurdish politics but would become part of the wider balance of power within the federal government and Baghdad's political blocs.

This development is directly connected to regional autonomy.

The region's administrative autonomy depends not only on legal provisions but also on its practical ability to manage institutions and resources and maintain unified decision-making.

The more divided the region appears in its dealings with Baghdad, the greater the federal government's ability to intervene in matters previously administered by regional authorities or to link financial agreements to new political arrangements.

Chatham House notes that partisan disputes in recent years have weakened the KRG's capacity to manage its political and economic affairs, creating conditions for its influence to decline relative to the federal government.

The judicial process, meanwhile, plays an important role in defining jurisdictional boundaries and determining the validity of procedures, but it cannot independently produce a political settlement.

A court can rule on a lawsuit or require constitutional compliance, but it cannot determine a mutually acceptable distribution of ministerial portfolios, restore trust between political leaders, or guarantee cooperation among ministers within a single government.

Judicial rulings should therefore not be assigned greater significance than they can bear. Court dates and decisions must also be reported according to the latest available developments, as the legal proceedings remain subject to rapid change.

Regional Tensions Raise the Cost of Division

The crisis is unfolding amid widespread regional tensions and growing security threats affecting Iraq and the Kurdistan Region.

Since the beginning of 2026, the region has reportedly been subjected to more than 1,000 attacks by Iran or groups aligned with it in the context of the regional war.

In such an environment, fragmented political and security decision-making makes it more difficult to protect civilians and infrastructure and to engage with Baghdad and international partners through a unified position.

External mediation may no longer be capable of imposing a settlement as it did during earlier periods.

U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack urged the two parties to overcome their differences and met officials from both sides, emphasizing the importance of regional unity. Yet the exchanges between Kurdish leaders demonstrated that external pressure alone is insufficient when the domestic causes of the crisis remain unresolved.

A Chatham House analysis similarly argues that the ability of the United States and Europe to act as arbiters has diminished, while neighboring countries can adapt to a more fragmented Kurdistan through established local, economic, and security relationships.

This means that division could alter not only the region's relationship with Baghdad but also the political room for maneuver available to both Kurdish parties in regional affairs.

A unified leadership can negotiate border security, energy issues, and relations with Turkey, Iran, and the federal government from a more cohesive position.

Multiple centers of authority, by contrast, create opportunities for external powers to deal separately with individual areas or political leaders.

This does not mean that every external actor seeks to divide the region. Rather, the danger is that unified regional decision-making may become less important in their calculations, allowing internal disagreements to become channels of external influence and pressure.

The consequences extend beyond security.

The region depends on political stability to sustain investment, trade, and coordination over revenues and energy. If investors or international partners become uncertain about who holds final decision-making authority or whether the KRG can fulfill its commitments, the costs may emerge through postponed projects, declining confidence, and increased business risks.

Political unity is therefore not merely a symbolic slogan; it is a prerequisite for effective negotiations, investment, and crisis management.

Citizens Confront Conflicting Centers of Decision-Making

Partisan disputes are often described in terms of positions and political leaders, but their most visible consequences are felt in people's daily lives.

The regional government is responsible for salaries, public services, and economic policy. Any deterioration in coordination among decision-making centers affects the clarity of institutional responsibilities and the ability of public bodies to implement their decisions.

In the original article, researcher Pinar Faik Karim warned that continued fragmentation could make governance more complicated, obstruct coordination over services and economic policy, and increase uncertainty surrounding salaries, revenues, and relations with Baghdad.

The problem begins when citizens no longer know which authority is responsible for delayed administrative procedures, inadequate services, or conflicting financial decisions.

If a central regional government retains its formal title while local party leaders exercise effective decision-making authority, holding officials accountable and identifying the institution responsible for responding to complaints becomes increasingly difficult.

Service provision may also vary between governorates according to each area's access to resources or the priorities of the dominant political party, transforming political competition into administrative disparities that residents experience every day.

Salaries are particularly sensitive because regular payments depend on understandings between Erbil and Baghdad and the management of public resources.

Any division over which authority receives or distributes funds raises questions about payment mechanisms, schedules, and responsibility for delays.

Conflicting policies may also affect public employees, traders, and business owners, making economic decisions less predictable.

This does not mean that every ministerial withdrawal will immediately disrupt services. It does, however, weaken coordination and confidence and increase the likelihood that each financial crisis will become another subject of political bargaining.

The cost of division also extends to political society.

When voters feel that their ballots do not produce an effective government and that election results fail to establish clear rules for the transfer of power, confidence in the political process declines.

If consensus appears to mean the distribution of benefits among political parties, while majority rule appears to mean excluding competitors, the distance between citizens and institutions widens.

Reforming the partnership is therefore not simply a matter of reconciling party leaders. It also requires demonstrating that parliament and government can produce accountable public decisions that serve residents across the region.

Possible Scenarios and the Conditions for Preventing Division

The first scenario remains a negotiated settlement that restores PUK participation and allows a new government to be formed under an arrangement combining electoral strength with guarantees of partnership.

This would not necessarily require a literal return to the old equal power-sharing formula or granting the largest party the right to govern alone.

Rather, it would require a publicly announced agreement specifying how positions are distributed, the powers of the prime minister and ministries, decision-making procedures, and mechanisms for addressing future disagreements.

The second scenario involves continued political deadlock without formal separation.

Under this arrangement, parliament would remain in place, the previous government would continue operating with limited or disputed authority, and both parties would keep negotiating while competing for support in Baghdad.

Although this situation might appear less dangerous than the establishment of two administrations, it would accumulate institutional costs and diminish the region's ability to make long-term decisions.

It could also gradually evolve into functional separation if services, resources, and administrative decisions came to be managed through distinct partisan centers.

The third scenario would involve transferring broader powers to governorates and local levels of government to reduce friction between the two parties.

Proposals of this kind have been advanced as a possible way out of the deadlock, but they raise a fundamental question: Would decentralization produce more efficient and accountable local government, or would it consolidate the parties' control over their respective territories and transform existing divisions into a constitutional arrangement?

Chatham House warns that transferring financial and administrative powers to local levels dominated by political parties could entrench partisan control and weaken shared institutions unless accompanied by effective oversight and guarantees of equitable revenue distribution.

The most dangerous scenario would involve the formal establishment of a parallel administration, followed by conflicting decisions, separate distribution of resources, and potentially competing claims over security institutions.

Some observers consider it unlikely that the current crisis will immediately bring down the existing government or trigger armed confrontation. They nevertheless regard the withdrawal as a serious blow to joint governance that deepens its vulnerability.

Foreign Policy cited researcher Mohammed A. Salih as assessing that the withdrawal of PUK ministers damages the government but does not automatically bring it down, while both sides continue to leave the door open to negotiations.

The prospects for containing the crisis depend on four interconnected conditions.

First, both parties must agree on general rules for forming a government rather than negotiating each position separately without an overarching framework.

Second, institutions must regain their independent roles so that parliamentary sessions and ministerial decisions do not become mere extensions of party leadership directives.

Third, practical guarantees are needed to unify the administration of resources, salaries, and public services, with transparency in revenues and disbursement procedures.

Fourth, both parties must accept the outcomes of legal proceedings without turning the judiciary into an alternative arena for settling political disputes.

Regional Unity Requires Clear Rules of Governance

The Kurdistan Region does not face a simple choice between unity and division. It already experiences a disparity between the legal unity of its institutions and the existence of multiple centers of influence in practice.

What the current crisis has exposed is that this gap can no longer be concealed through declarations of partnership or the postponement of decisions.

A government that cannot be formed, a parliament that resumes its work amid a boycott by a major political force, and ministers who withdraw from office are all indications that the existing political arrangement requires reassessment.

Nevertheless, the two parties still have room to reach a settlement that prevents both formal and functional fragmentation.

Both understand that a return to two separate administrations would weaken the region's position vis-à-vis Baghdad and neighboring countries, complicate the management of salaries, public services, and security, and undermine the institutional recognition of autonomy achieved over the years.

Citizens, meanwhile, have no interest in bearing the costs of a power-sharing struggle that guarantees neither an effective government nor meaningful oversight of public funds.

Protecting the region's unity requires more than calls to overcome differences; it requires rules that make disagreements manageable, preserve shared institutions, and effectively protect the interests of all its citizens.

This includes respecting election results without abandoning the principle of participation, ensuring that partnership does not become an exclusive arrangement for distributing positions, unifying security and administrative institutions, and linking resources to clear mechanisms of accountability and distribution.

If the KDP and PUK can move beyond bargaining between party leaders toward a publicly declared institutional agreement, parliament could become an arena for resolving political differences rather than an instrument for entrenching dominance. The regional government could then remain an inclusive framework rather than a cover for competition between two administrations.

If, however, each party continues treating regional institutions as extensions of its own influence, unity will remain vulnerable to gradual erosion even without a formal declaration of separation.

Under such circumstances, the crisis may not begin with an official decision to divide Kurdistan, but with a progressive decline in the government's ability to implement decisions across all areas, followed by the emergence of multiple authorities responsible for salaries, services, and security.

The coming weeks will therefore provide the decisive test: not through the forcefulness of competing political statements, but through the parties' ability to turn threats into negotiations and negotiations into rules of governance that protect the region and its citizens.

Sources

Foreign Policy; Chatham House; Associated Press; Reuters; Middle East Institute; Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq; United Nations in Iraq; Federal Supreme Court of Iraq.

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