“Al-Zaidi’s success will depend on his ability to turn the parties’ willingness to communicate into workable understandings, while preventing the war from spreading into Iraq and preserving Iraq’s domestic stability.”
From a secret visit to Tehran to proposals for ending the U.S.–Iran war, Iraq’s prime minister enters the diplomatic arena amid disagreements over the terms of a settlement and fears that the conflict could spread to Iraq.
As concerns mount over a renewed military confrontation between the United States and Iran, Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has entered diplomatic efforts to end the war following an unannounced visit to Tehran on Friday, November 6, 2026. The visit was preceded by contacts with U.S. President Donald Trump, amid reports that the American president had agreed to Iraqi proposals aimed at ending the conflict. The initiative has presented Baghdad with a new diplomatic opportunity to position itself as a mediator between two powers with which it maintains complex political, security and economic relationships.
Details of the visit emerged three days later, when Iraqi and Iranian sources reported that al-Zaidi had held talks with Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who heads Iran’s negotiating team. Reports also indicated that the Iraqi delegation included Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Chairman Falih al-Fayyadh and Badr Organization Secretary-General Hadi al-Amiri. Their reported participation gave the visit significance beyond conventional diplomatic engagement, given the regional war’s connection to the calculations of armed factions and the internal security balance in Iraq.
According to sources cited by Al Arabiya Al Hadath, Trump expressed approval of proposals presented by al-Zaidi during a telephone conversation and asked him to convey them to Tehran and serve as a mediator in efforts to end the war. However, the precise details of those proposals have not been disclosed, nor has any official statement specified the commitments Washington was prepared to undertake. The nature and scope of the reported American approval therefore remain central to understanding the Iraqi mission and the outcomes it might produce.
Al-Zaidi’s visit is particularly significant because it coincided with continuing disagreements between Washington and Tehran over the conditions for resuming negotiations, especially the U.S. naval blockade, economic sanctions and guarantees for ending military operations. Iran insists that the United States must fulfill certain commitments before negotiations resume, while the American administration seeks guarantees against renewed hostilities and arrangements that would safeguard navigation and trade in the region.
Why Did Al-Zaidi Enter U.S.–Iran Mediation Efforts?
Iraq’s diplomatic initiative cannot be separated from the position the country occupies in the strained relationship between the United States and Iran. Baghdad maintains a political, security and economic partnership with Washington while simultaneously sustaining extensive ties with Tehran encompassing trade, energy and political and security cooperation. Any military escalation between the two countries consequently places direct pressure on Iraqi institutions and their ability to maintain domestic stability.
Available information suggests that al-Zaidi sought to capitalize on these overlapping relationships to establish a new negotiating channel, particularly because Iraq can communicate with Iranian actors who are sometimes difficult to reach through other diplomatic channels. The reported presence of Iraqi figures with close ties to Iranian leaders may also have been intended to facilitate the delivery of American messages and provide a clearer understanding of Tehran’s position on the proposed initiative.
The participation of Falih al-Fayyadh and Hadi al-Amiri, if all reported details are accurate, carries additional significance for Iraq’s security situation. Any successful agreement to halt the war may require understandings that reduce the likelihood of armed factions becoming involved in the confrontation and prevent Iraqi territory from being used to launch attacks by either side. These issues are directly connected to Baghdad’s concerns that regional tensions could develop into a domestic crisis that would be difficult to contain through political means alone.
The National reported that the visit took place at Trump’s request to establish a channel for de-escalation. Iraq’s ambassador to Tehran, Yasser al-Hajjaj, confirmed that the initiative formed part of Iraqi efforts to prevent the confrontation from expanding and to strengthen regional stability. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein subsequently explained that al-Zaidi’s visit sought to narrow differences between the Americans and Iranians by drawing on Baghdad’s relationships with both sides.
From this perspective, al-Zaidi’s mission appears to serve two interconnected objectives. The first is to help end the war and establish an acceptable negotiating framework, while the second is to reduce the risks facing the Iraqi state if escalation continues. This gives the diplomatic initiative direct importance for Iraq, even if it does not quickly produce a comprehensive agreement between Washington and Tehran.
What Did Al-Zaidi’s Proposals, Reportedly Approved by Trump, Include?
Published reports have not disclosed the detailed text of the initiative al-Zaidi presented to Trump. Nevertheless, the nature of the disagreements between Washington and Tehran, together with their publicly stated conditions for ending the war, makes it possible to identify several potential proposals that may have formed the basis of Iraqi-American contacts. These possibilities remain political analysis rather than confirmed information.
The first possibility is that al-Zaidi proposed a temporary military truce that would allow negotiations to resume without requiring a final agreement in advance. Under such an arrangement, offensive military operations would cease for a specified period in exchange for an Iranian commitment not to target American interests or threaten regional navigation. This could provide both sides with an opportunity to test the seriousness of de-escalation without making comprehensive strategic concessions at the outset of negotiations.
The second possibility concerns a gradual settlement of the economic dispute, involving the easing of certain U.S. restrictions on Iran in exchange for guarantees concerning freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and the movement of international trade. The naval blockade and economic sanctions are central elements of Iran’s demands, while Washington regards economic restrictions as leverage for securing Iranian commitments on security and political issues.
The Iraqi initiative may also have included a proposal to freeze escalation across the regional fronts associated with the war, extending any understanding beyond the direct confrontation between the United States and Iran to military operations in other areas. Tehran has linked an end to the war to a cessation of military action on all fronts, a condition that further complicates negotiations because of the overlapping American, Israeli and Iranian interests involved and the number of actors capable of influencing military developments.
A fourth possibility involves specific guarantees for Iraq, based on preventing its territory from being used as a theater for military operations by either side, in exchange for Iraqi commitments to prevent armed-group activities that could expand the war. This aspect may be among those most closely connected to the Iraqi government’s immediate interests, given the risks escalation could pose to vital infrastructure, the economy and internal security.
The fifth possibility is a phased negotiating mechanism involving Baghdad alongside other regional mediators, beginning with reciprocal confidence-building measures before progressing toward a comprehensive agreement. Such an approach would allow urgent issues involving the cessation of military operations and freedom of navigation to be addressed separately from more complex matters, including sanctions, security guarantees and long-term regional arrangements.
Trump’s reported approval, as described by media sources, may have concerned a general negotiating framework or a willingness to test the Iraqi initiative rather than final acceptance of all its details. The American administration has not released a list of conditions it agreed to, leaving open several interpretations of the mandate al-Zaidi received before traveling to Tehran.
Iran Receives the Mediator but Maintains Its Conditions for Ending the War
The outcome of al-Zaidi’s visit raised questions about Iran’s position after the Tasnim News Agency cited informed sources as saying that the talks had failed to produce results satisfying American demands. The Fars News Agency, meanwhile, reported that Ghalibaf had expressed appreciation for Iraqi efforts and presented the Iranian delegation’s initiative, known as the two-day plan, to the visitors, stressing that Washington must respect Iran’s rights for negotiations to move forward.
The different emphasis in these accounts helps explain Tehran’s position on the initiative. Receiving the Iraqi delegation and praising its efforts suggest that Iran remains willing to maintain diplomatic communication through Baghdad. At the same time, the failure to achieve results acceptable to Washington reflects disagreements over the proposed conditions or the sequence in which commitments should be implemented. This does not necessarily mean that Iraqi mediation has ended or that communication channels between the two sides have closed.
Iran continues to advocate a proposal requiring the United States to implement several measures before negotiations resume. These include lifting the naval blockade, easing or removing sanctions in accordance with the required understandings, ending military operations across the various fronts, and releasing frozen Iranian assets. In return for the implementation of these conditions, Tehran would take steps to restore navigation through the Strait of Hormuz within a two-day period.
Tehran had previously proposed a seven-day timeframe for arrangements to reopen the strait before reducing it to two days, seeking to present its initiative as a rapid framework for ending the escalation. However, disagreements with Washington persisted over the nature and timing of the required commitments, particularly after U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio criticized certain Iranian conditions.
In light of these positions, the difficulties encountered during al-Zaidi’s visit can be interpreted as stemming more from the substance of the proposals than from Iranian rejection of Iraqi mediation in principle. Tehran appears to be seeking American guarantees and measures that would precede negotiations, while the initiative carried by al-Zaidi may have been based on reciprocal, phased implementation. This represents a fundamental difference in the approach to reaching an agreement, even when both sides share the stated objective of ending the war.
This interpretation does not mean that every element of the Iraqi initiative has been definitively rejected, since the precise details of the discussions have not been published. Continued official Iraqi references to diplomatic efforts also indicate that Baghdad still regards its role as a viable channel, despite the absence of a clear breakthrough in the first round of contacts.
Iraq Between a Peace Mission and the Risks of Internal Confrontation
The importance of Iraqi mediation extends beyond U.S.–Iran relations because the continuation of the war confronts Baghdad with challenges involving border security, armed-faction activity, protection of foreign diplomatic missions and economic facilities, and potential effects on energy supplies, trade and government spending. These issues make Iraq’s stability highly sensitive to the level of tension between Washington and Tehran.
Iraqi reports point to increasing American pressure concerning the activities of armed factions and the possibility of their involvement in any renewed confrontation. At the same time, Iraqi political forces recognize the sensitivity of adopting security measures that could trigger internal clashes. The government therefore faces a difficult balancing act: maintaining relations with Washington without entering into confrontation with actors that wield political and security influence inside the country.
In this context, al-Zaidi’s diplomatic initiative can be understood as an attempt to address a source of external pressure that directly affects domestic stability. A U.S.–Iran truce could help ease tensions surrounding armed factions and give the government greater room to manage security issues outside an environment of military mobilization and regional polarization.
These efforts become even more important given Iraq’s dependence on stable trade routes and the energy sector to sustain economic activity. An expansion of the war could impose additional costs on imports, insurance, transportation and investment, while potentially affecting development and infrastructure projects that require a stable regional environment.
On this basis, al-Zaidi’s success in keeping Iraq out of the confrontation would constitute a diplomatic achievement in its own right, independently of whether a comprehensive agreement to end the war is reached. Conversely, the failure of regional diplomatic efforts could increase security and economic pressures on Baghdad, particularly if continued escalation is accompanied by demands from the warring parties for Iraq to adopt more clearly defined positions.
Possible Scenarios Following Al-Zaidi’s Visit to Tehran
The outcome of the secret visit opens several possible paths that could shape the future of Iraqi mediation. Continuing U.S.–Iran disagreements over the conditions for negotiations do not necessarily prevent proposals from being revised, while the security and economic circumstances surrounding the war may encourage the parties involved to seek interim arrangements that reduce the risks of escalation without immediately reaching a final settlement.
Scenario One: Revising the Proposals and Resuming Negotiations
Under this scenario, al-Zaidi would renew contacts with the American administration to convey the Iranian reservations raised during his visit and attempt to develop a revised formula addressing some of Tehran’s demands concerning the blockade, sanctions and the sequence of commitments. This could allow negotiations to resume through Iraqi mediation or broader coordination with regional actors.
Such an approach could involve an agreement to temporarily halt military operations, followed by reciprocal economic and security measures. Washington would thereby avoid making all its concessions before obtaining guarantees, while Tehran would secure clear commitments preventing negotiations from being used as cover for continued military and economic pressure.
The prospects for this scenario depend on both sides’ willingness to show flexibility over the sequence of implementation and Baghdad’s ability to provide guarantees or communication channels capable of resolving the disagreements that prevented progress during the first visit.
Scenario Two: Iraqi Mediation Succeeds in Keeping Iraq Out of the War
The initiative could produce limited results directly related to Iraq’s interests even if disagreements between Washington and Tehran persist. These might include security understandings preventing Iraqi territory from being used for military operations, reducing the likelihood of attacks on vital facilities and foreign diplomatic missions, and helping the government manage its relationship with armed factions through arrangements that lower the risks of internal confrontation.
This scenario represents one of the practical objectives Baghdad may seek to achieve. Preventing the war from spreading into Iraq could ease political, security and economic pressures and allow the government to maintain communication with both sides without becoming directly involved in the conflict.
Scenario Three: Expanding Mediation into a Joint Regional Framework
The Iraqi initiative could become part of broader diplomatic efforts involving countries that maintain communication channels with Washington and Tehran, particularly Qatar and Pakistan. Responsibilities could be divided among mediators across political, security and economic issues, while efforts would focus on consolidating proposals capable of forming the basis of an interim agreement.
This approach would reduce the pressure on the Iraqi mediator and provide the negotiating parties with additional options for exchanging messages, discussing guarantees and implementing commitments. Its success, however, would depend on agreement over the objectives of mediation and avoiding the proliferation of conflicting initiatives.
Scenario Four: Continued Military and Economic Pressure Without an Agreement
This scenario assumes that diplomatic contacts continue without a breakthrough on the central issues, while the U.S. naval blockade and economic restrictions remain in place and Iran maintains its declared conditions concerning sanctions relief and an end to military operations before negotiations resume.
The continuation of this situation could weaken mediators’ ability to achieve rapid results, particularly if both sides use military and economic pressure to improve their negotiating positions. Such developments could prolong the crisis and intensify its consequences for the regional economy, international navigation and Iraqi stability.
Scenario Five: Mediation Falters and the Confrontation Expands
This scenario involves the collapse of negotiating channels or a new military escalation that reduces the prospects for a settlement, whether through the resumption of large-scale military operations or the extension of hostilities into additional areas, including Iraqi territory, where domestic security calculations are closely connected to developments in the regional war.
Such developments could confront the Iraqi government with challenges involving control over armed factions, protection of national interests and prevention of Iraqi territory from becoming a theater of conflict. They could also increase economic and security costs while narrowing the space available for diplomatic initiatives.
The course of future developments will depend on the responses exchanged between Washington and Tehran, whether Iraqi contacts continue through further visits or indirect discussions, and how military developments and economic sanctions affect both sides’ calculations and their ability to reach interim understandings.
Can the Peace Envoy Achieve Acceptable Results?
The results al-Zaidi’s mediation can achieve depend on the objectives pursued by the parties involved. Washington wants arrangements that prevent the recurrence of security threats and protect its regional interests, while Tehran demands the removal of economic restrictions, an end to military operations and guarantees safeguarding its interests. Baghdad, meanwhile, is focused on preventing the confrontation from spreading onto Iraqi territory and preserving its relationships with both sides.
These differing priorities give Iraqi mediation room to pursue specific understandings, particularly if urgent measures concerning a cessation of hostilities and freedom of navigation are separated from strategic issues requiring longer negotiations. Turning that opportunity into tangible results, however, requires American and Iranian acceptance of a reciprocal mechanism for implementing commitments.
The failure of Friday’s visit to produce results meeting American demands does not rule out continued contacts. Mediation in military conflicts often proceeds through stages involving the exchange of proposals and reservations and the reformulation of conditions before an agreement can be reached. Some rounds may help clarify the precise points of disagreement without producing an immediate settlement.
Al-Zaidi’s role also depends on his ability to maintain balance in Iraq’s foreign relations and prevent the initiative from becoming a source of domestic disagreement. Any commitments involving armed factions or security arrangements require the institutional and political capacity to implement them in a manner consistent with Iraq’s national interests.
Accordingly, acceptable outcomes from the mediation are not limited to a comprehensive end to the war. They could include a temporary cessation of military operations, reduced tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, the resumption of negotiations, or understandings that protect Iraq from becoming involved in the confrontation. These outcomes would differ in scope and impact, but all would be connected to the central objective of the Iraqi initiative.
The Future of Iraqi Mediation Between Washington and Tehran
Al-Zaidi’s secret visit to Tehran has placed Iraq in a new diplomatic role in one of the region’s most complex crises. Baghdad has moved from being a state affected by U.S.–Iran tensions to attempting to address their causes and limit their consequences, drawing on its relationships with both sides and its immediate need to halt escalation.
Despite reports that Trump approved the Iraqi proposals, the absence of their details and Iran’s continued insistence on its two-day plan mean that any assessment of the mediation’s outcome will depend on what emerges from subsequent contacts and on the parties’ ability to resolve disagreements over sanctions, the blockade, security guarantees and the sequence in which commitments are implemented.
Al-Zaidi’s success will depend on his ability to turn the parties’ willingness to communicate into workable understandings, while preventing the war from spreading into Iraq and preserving Iraq’s domestic stability. Keeping Baghdad actively involved in diplomatic efforts to end the conflict may itself represent an outcome closely aligned with Iraq’s national interests.
With Washington and Tehran continuing to hold divergent positions, the Iraqi initiative remains one of the available channels for narrowing their differences. It could provide the foundation for another round of negotiations if sufficient political will emerges to move beyond exchanging conditions toward implementing reciprocal measures. Its ultimate results, however, will remain dependent on military and economic developments and the willingness of both sides to reach a settlement.
Sources
- Reuters, “Iran Defends Two-Day Proposal to Resume Peace Talks After U.S. Rejects Conditions,” November 9, 2026.
- The National, “Iraqi Prime Minister Makes Secret Visit to Tehran at Trump’s Request in Bid to Ease Tensions,” November 9, 2026.
- Anadolu Agency, “Iraqi Prime Minister Makes Unannounced Visit to Tehran to Discuss Ending Iran–U.S. War,” November 9, 2026.
- Fars News Agency, “Al-Zaidi’s Unannounced Visit to Tehran and Talks with Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf on Ending the War,” November 9, 2026.
- Tasnim News Agency, “Details of Al-Zaidi’s Visit to Tehran and the Outcome of His Talks with Iranian Officials,” November 9, 2026.
- Al Arabiya Al Hadath, “Trump Approves Al-Zaidi’s Proposals to End the War with Iran and Asks Him to Convey Them to Tehran,” November 9, 2026.
- Ultra Iraq, “He Called Trump, Met Barrack and Then Traveled to Tehran: Details of Iraqi Mediation,” November 9, 2026.
- 964media, “Iran Rejected Al-Zaidi’s Proposals to End the War Despite Trump’s Approval, According to Tasnim Sources,” November 9, 2026.
- Shafaq News, “Iraqi Prime Minister Carries Proposal from Trump to Tehran to End the War,” November 9, 2026.
- Anadolu Agency, “Iraq Confirms Al-Zaidi’s Visit to Iran Was Intended to Bring Tehran and Washington Closer,” November 10, 2026.
- Iraqi News Agency, “Statements by Iraq’s Ambassador to Tehran, Yasser al-Hajjaj, on the Unannounced Visit and De-escalation Efforts,” November 9, 2026.
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