Michael Rubin
When the Islamic State is defeated in Iraq and/or Syria, the time for celebration and political grandstanding will be short-lived. After all, even if Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s caliphate ends, he has already laid the groundwork for its successors. And, unless the United States, Iraq, and Iraqi Kurds are able to capture and kill or imprison tens of thousands of foreign fighters and perhaps even more local ones, Islamic State veterans will live to fight again, potentially destabilizing dozens of countries when and if they return. Indeed, after US Navy Seals killed Al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda affiliates appeared to compete with each other to stage attacks in order to assert their primacy in a post-Bin Laden-era.
It’s essential, therefore, to learn as much as possible as quickly as possible about how the Islamic State managed to surprise everyone and seize so much territory in its initial 2014 operations. Here, scholars and analysts have a jump start thanks to the work of Anne Speckhard and Ahmet Yayla, respectively the director and deputy director at the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism at George Mason University. The pair is best known for their recent book, ISIS Defectors: Inside Stories of the Terrorist Caliphate, but they are incredibly prolific.
They have now published online a lengthy study of the Islamic State’s intelligence operations as told by defectors to which they have had access. They describe how the Islamic State works to gather information on those living under its control, as well as how it seeks to gather intelligence on areas into which they seek to expand. In addition, they discuss the Islamic State’s logistical support inside Turkey, recruitment, vetting for would-be jihadis who appear but are not known to recruiters, as well as interactions with other terrorist groups and intelligence services, including those of the Assad regime.
For example, they explain Islamic State strategy before attacking new areas:
Well before their arrival, the Emni [the Islamic state’s intelligence unit] also places well‐paid informants in villages they intend to invade to map out the political and ideological stands of those living there. Upon capturing the village, and given they have already categorized the people, their modus operandi is to quickly order and carry out assassinations of those they have identified as enemies, or incapable of working with them.
They also show how fear permeates not only the civilian population, but also the apparatchiks within the Islamic State:
The Emni also carefully studies the population of areas they gain control of to safeguard their positions and to eliminate all dissenters inside the borders of the “Islamic State.” Having learned well from Saddam’s totalitarian state, paid informants are placed everywhere inside ISIS, creating a widespread fear of defying the group in any manner. ISIS defectors were even skeptical of their own family members, including young children, fearing that they may have been turned into informants. Some observed children as young as 6 and 7‐years‐old being trained and deployed for intelligence work. ISIS cadres also reported that they were loath to divulge to other members their doubts and disgust with ISIS’ brutality for fear of being informed upon and punished.
There will be much more to be gained if US authorities can seize Islamic State intelligence documents and assets before governments such as Turkey’s or perhaps even some elements within Kurdistan Regional Government who might want to cover up their own complicity. But, at the very least, it is time US military and intelligence authorities understand just how the Islamic State managed to achieve militarily what they did, for the likelihood of facing down similar Islamist movements in the future remains quite high.
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